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Peacekeeping in Africa: The EU at a Crossroads 
Aleksandra Tor 
The European Union (EU) is involved in global 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities mainly 
through its Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) missions. Africa has been the main region of 
EU activity. Since its first operation on the continent 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003, 
missions have been deployed in almost a dozen 
African countries. Africa is also the only region where 
the EU deploys as many civilian as military 
operations, which are involved in a wide range of 
activities, such as police training, anti-piracy and 
border surveillance. 
The African continent is currently host to the largest 
number of peacekeeping missions, including eight 
United Nations (UN) operations, nine EU CSDP missions 
and several African-led initiatives, with more than 
120,000 troops deployed. Since 2006, Africa is the only 
region in the world with a continuously growing number 
of both peacekeeping operations and personnel 
deployed (SIPRI 2017).   
This trend is likely to continue since Africa remains the 
region the most prone to conflicts, with many fragile 
countries and asymmetric and complex threats, including 
intrastate conflicts, cross-border disputes, violence 
against civilians and active terrorist groups (Arnould 
2017). These threats require rapid reactions and 
deployment of missions with war-fighting mandates. 
Moreover, African countries rely heavily on external 
military and peacekeeping support, mostly because a lack 
of resources limits their ability to independently respond 
to security threats. 
The EU is currently facing both external and internal 
challenges that call into question its role as a 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding actor in Africa. 
Externally challenging is the significant diversification of 
security actors on the continent. African states and 
African regional organizations are becoming more active, 
but also new international actors have become engaged, 
particularly China. Internally, the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom (UK) from the EU and the CSDP, as well 
as the implementation of the 2016 EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS) have strategic implications for the EU’s 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. 
This policy brief discusses the potential impact of these 
external and internal factors on the EU’s role in African 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and suggests steps to 
maintain its position as an important security actor. 
 
Executive Summary 
> Africa is host to the largest number of 
peacekeeping operations in the world, and 
will continue to rely on external military 
and peacekeeping support. 
> The diversification of security players on 
the African continent as well as the 
European Union’s internal challenges, 
mainly related to Brexit, force the EU to 
redefine its role as a peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding actor in Africa. 
> To remain a significant security actor on 
the African continent, the EU needs to 
clearly define its identity as a value-driven 
security player, decide on the type of 
missions it wants to focus on and clarify 
and structure its cooperation with African 
partners and other international players in 
the field.  
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A crowded security landscape in Africa 
In the early 2000s, CSDP missions in Africa were mostly 
bridging missions before the arrival of UN forces. Since 
2010, EU military missions started to focus more on 
training and assistance. The EU Training Mission in 
Somalia was the first military training operation followed 
by other missions in Mali and in the Central African 
Republic (CAR). In theory, military missions should be 
followed by civilian ones, which then focus on capacity-
building and on enabling third countries to manage and 
prevent crises themselves (Zandee 2015). Even though 
this system is far from perfect, often with delays 
regarding the deployment of civilian missions and overlap 
with other initiatives, the training and capacity-building 
components (nowadays understood as actions aimed at 
‘building resilience’) became the EU’s signature 
initiatives. Since the current security threats in Africa are 
more violent and developing more rapidly, old and new 
security actors active on the continent are trying to 
adjust to these circumstances.  
Peacekeeping as an African activity  
Among the emerging security actors in the field of 
peacekeeping are African states and African regional 
organisations. African-led peacekeeping operations have 
some significant advantages over large UN operations 
with a comprehensive mandate and EU missions, given 
that African organisations have more freedom to 
mandate missions. The African Union (AU) has a less rigid 
definition of the non-interference principle than, for 
instance, the EU. This means that it can intervene more 
easily in cases of mass atrocities, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in one of its member states.  
In recent years, the AU and its regional communities 
conducted several peacekeeping missions, the most well-
known being the African Union Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM), which deployed over 100,000 personnel. The 
AU has also created a strategic framework on 
peacekeeping, the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA). The organisation has been willing to 
engage in active conflicts where there is ‘no peace to 
keep’ yet. It has been able to react rapidly, like in the 
cases of CAR and Mali where the UN authorised the AU 
peace support missions as bridging operations. The UN 
Security Council is less hesitant to authorise interventions 
driven by the AU, as this implies that the African-led 
missions, instead of the UN peacekeeping operations, 
would become associated with the brutal combat that is 
sometimes necessary to stabilise conflict situations. 
The fact that peacekeeping is becoming more of an 
‘African activity’ is not only apparent in the growing 
number of African-led operations, but also in the 
significant growth of troop contributions to UN missions. 
As of 2016, the top 20 list of UN troop contributors has 
been headed by Ethiopia with more than 8,000 troops, 
followed by eleven other African states. The list does not 
include any Western country. 
However, this ‘African solutions to African problems’ 
approach has some major flaws. First, even though 
African countries contribute up to 60 percent of the 
troops to peacekeeping missions, they contribute less 
than one percent to the AU peacekeeping operations 
budget and less than half a percent to the UN 
peacekeeping budget. The AU’s African Peace Budget is 
mainly financed by the EU, the EU’s member states and 
the United States (US). The EU constitutes the main 
source of funding for the AU and its Regional Economic 
Communities (REC) through the African Peace Facility 
(APF), which has received € 2 billion in total since 2004. 
Second, the coordination within and between regional 
organisations is far from perfect. While the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
are  considered as somewhat coordinated, in the East and 
in the Horn of Africa, the countries belonging to the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are 
consumed in power struggles. They often do not manage 
to formulate a common response to these security 
threats. During the conflicts in Somalia and in the Eastern 
part of the DRC, neighbouring countries have intervened 
militarily, bypassing the existing missions of the AU and 
the UN. 
Third, APSA, which was created in 2002, has only existed 
on paper, mainly due to a lack of funding. At this point, 
the African Standby Force (ASF), the core part of APSA, is 
still not operational. 
Finally, most of the African countries are contributing to 
international peacekeeping missions with a national 
agenda. The largest troops contributors are authoritarian 
regimes like Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, and 
such international recognition gives them a certain 
legitimisation. Another motivation to participate in 
peacekeeping operations is to ensure that soldiers 
receive a decent salary in order to prevent military coups. 
Despite these problems, African-led missions could 
become the future of peacekeeping, and should not be 
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underestimated. This growing activity of the African 
actors is already influencing the EU’s role in the field and 
will continue to do so.  
With a greater focus on African-led missions, the EU may 
easily be forced to play the sole role of a donor. This was 
already visible in 2016, when the EU cut its allocation for 
soldier allowances in AMISOM by 20 percent, which 
provoked harsh reactions by African countries alongside 
threats to withdraw their soldiers.  
To prevent this degradation of its role, the EU could focus 
on training activities to become more of an expert and 
skills provider. If the EU focuses on enhancing the 
capabilities of African countries by training security 
forces, this can help them to better respond to security 
threats. This in turn would qualify as a resilience-building 
initiative by the EU, whose importance is highlighted in 
the EUGS. However, considering the number of African 
authoritarian states, it may also lead to an increase of 
violence towards civilians. Balancing the training of 
military staff while still ensuring respect for human rights 
and the rule of law may be a daunting task.  
Other international actors 
China is becoming a well-stablished security actor on the 
African continent, gradually shifting from its policy of 
non-interference to ‘constructive involvement’. This is 
visible through a sharp increase of its troop contribution 
to UN operations (around 1,500 peacekeepers as of 2016, 
which is over 15 times higher than ten years ago) as well 
as its willingness to send troops to more dangerous 
places like Mali and South Sudan.   
Moreover, Chinese presence in Africa also motivates 
other Asian actors, especially Japan and India, to increase 
their security-related involvement on the continent. 
The growing presence of China in Africa can have 
significant implications for the EU. First, China, just like 
the EU, prioritises acting through African regional 
organisations and already donated millions of dollars to 
AMISOM while increasing its military aid to the ASF to 
$100 million. Even though these sums are still 
significantly lower than the contribution by the EU and its 
member states, it is possible that the African partners will 
in the future be more keen on accepting Chinese 
contributions, as they do not come with conditions 
regarding the lack of rule of law or democratic conduct. 
Second, peacebuilding operations usually aim to protect 
or to create peace and democracy. China’s peacekeeping 
engagement, linked to a democratisation agenda, may 
have unintended domestic implications, preventing 
further participation in new operations. The EU’s CSDP 
missions driven by an agenda to defend human rights, 
rule of law and democracy may in this sense have an 
advantage, as the EU is a more coherent and well-
established defender of these values. 
Third, Chinese private security companies are more 
involved in protecting the Chinese workers overseas than 
in peacebuilding and peacekeeping. They cost the same 
as local security providers, and significantly less than 
Western ones. If these private security companies start 
being used in a broader peacekeeping sense, they could 
become competition for the EU counter-piracy missions 
and a more cost-effective alternative for the deployment 
of the rapid on-land groups. 
Internal Challenges 
The EU’s changing role in peacekeeping is not only 
determined by factors in the international area but also 
by recent changes within the Union. The ongoing 
discussion on whether the EU should focus more on the 
military or civilian component of CSDP missions is fuelled 
by the possible implications of Brexit.  
The impact of Brexit  
Brexit will have several consequences for EU 
peacekeeping activities in Africa. The UK, together with 
France, is responsible for over 40 percent of public 
defence investment in the EU and is one of five EU 
member states spending two percent of its Gross 
Domestic Product on military expenditure. The UK is also 
the third largest contributor to the APF.  
Yet, more significant than this financial aspect are the 
strategic consequences of Brexit. The UK has been 
actively advocating for other member states to support 
AMISOM financially and was assisting the AU in drafting 
the strategy for Somalia (which has been listed as a key 
priority for the UK for its EU-related security activities). 
After Brexit, the AU will have to negotiate separately with 
the UK and with the EU, which increases the burden for 
an already understaffed and underfunded institution. 
This may force it to look for other contributors.   
The CSDP has always been driven by the UK and France. 
While the UK has frequently been leaning more towards 
the capacity-building component of CSDP missions, 
France was more focused on military aspects and 
championed a more proactive military engagement. This 
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latter was opposed by the UK desirous of avoiding 
duplication with NATO actions (Faleg 2016). With the UK 
outside of EU structures, French leadership becomes 
possible, and might result in a higher number of military 
missions. In its military interventions in Africa, France has 
already used force in more proactive ways (such as in 
Mali and CAR) and not just for self-defence purposes or 
for the protection of activities falling within its mandate.  
If France indeed manages to reorient CSDP operations 
towards greater military engagement, this might lead to a 
weakening of the EU’s position, particularly if limited 
efforts are made to strengthen the EU’s military 
capabilities. Other actors, notably African organizations, 
possess more suitable capabilities for a rapid deployment 
of small-sized military units, due to UNSC support and 
more limited checks and balances regarding troops 
deployment. With the UNSC preferring to give its 
mandate to missions that are headed by regional 
organizations, the EU might be left out of the main 
peacekeeping activities in the region.  
Blending EU civilian and military components 
Blending different components of civilian and military 
missions could be an option to overcome the challenge 
related to EU capabilities. It is already visible that the 
mandates of both types of missions are becoming more 
blurry and overlapping, and this trend will most likely 
continue.   
The EU Global Strategy puts more emphasis on the 
military aspects of the CSDP. The November 2016 Council 
Conclusions on implementation in CFSP and CSDP include 
the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability (MPCC) as an operation centre exclusively for 
non-executive missions. On the one hand, the creation of 
the MPCC can be perceived as a first step to a more 
developed EU military headquarters structure and a shift 
towards a more ‘military’ CSDP approach (Tardy 2017).  
On the other hand, the MPCC itself emphasises training 
and advisory military missions, which have a strong 
capacity-building component. All non-executive missions 
are currently taking place in Africa: in the CAR, Mali and 
Somalia, which indicates that there is a need for more 
capacity-building military initiatives in the region.  
Another step towards a greater military focus is the 
November 2017 establishment of Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PeSCo). As a legal framework for 
cooperation between its member states, PeSCO implies 
that its members commit to raising their defence 
spending and make their assets available for EU 
operations. 
For now, military operations fully depend on member 
state contributions and the budget of civilian missions is 
not very high (approximately €225 million in 2016). Since 
90 percent of EU development support must comply with 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) criteria for Official Development 
Aid, this is problematic. Contributions to security-related 
sectors have to be justified in each case, but these 
restrictions are already being bypassed. For example, the 
military training mission ‘EUTM Somalia’ has already 
received funding through the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (IcSP), which is the EU’s civilian 
development instrument, by claiming the funds as a 
contribution to AMISOM. The APF is more flexible 
because it does not fall under the general EU budget but 
is a part of the European Development Fund (EDF). APF 
as the main contributor to APSA was already used for the 
African Union operations ‘International Support Mission 
to the Central African Republic’ (MISCA) and ‘African 
Union Mission in Somalia’ (AMISOM), but it is constrained 
to regional missions. 
Further blending of the mandates of civilian and military 
missions would not only pose significant financing 
challenges but also certain risks regarding possible 
overlaps with existing EU development assistance 
initiatives. The European Commission plays the main role 
in civilian crisis management activities. Even though it is 
not directly involved in delivering the programmes, its 
role as a donor for the other agencies means that it has a 
significantly larger budget (IcSP only comprises €327 
million). The task division between the activities of the 
Commission and CSDP is already a source of internal 
tensions, and an increasingly blurred differentiation 
between military and civilian missions may lead to further 
fragmentation and duplication of actions.  
Conclusion 
To remain an important security player on the African 
continent, the EU needs to identify what kind of security 
actor it wants to be and what type of actor it effectively 
can be. 
First, if the EU decides to be an actor driven by a value-
based agenda, it should clearly present its peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding activities as promoting democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law. Since the majority of 
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the actors in the peacekeeping field in Africa have a poor 
track record when it comes to respecting these values, 
like the African states and China, the EU is perceived as a 
coherent democracy and human rights defender. 
However, sticking to such a value-driven agenda in a 
principled way would make cooperation with less value-
driven states more intricate. This could eventually leave 
the EU on the side-lines of activities in Africa, and thus be 
counterproductive in promoting its values. A pragmatic 
approach, as underscored in the EUGS would allow for a 
more strategic behaviour even if it means re-interpreting 
– on a case-by-case basis – the EU’s normative agenda.  
Second, having in mind the current need for shorter, 
military-focused operations to respond to security threats 
in Africa, the EU should define what types of missions it 
wants to focus. Since the EU does not have its own 
military capabilities and the military CSDP missions have 
so far not been very complex, the EU has essentially two 
options. The first option would be going into the direction 
of strengthening the common capabilities and militarising 
the CSDP to compete with the more militarised African-
led missions. The establishment of PeSCo and the MPCC 
can already be interpreted as a step towards this option. 
Yet, since the membership of PeSCo is voluntary, the 
results of this initiative are uncertain. The second option 
would be to merge the civilian and military mandates in 
only one type of missions, leading to military training 
missions with a strong development component. This 
would result in strong opposition from some member 
states regarding the sources of funding, and would 
require a change of EU funding rules (for instance, to 
allow for having missions financed by the IcSP). It would 
nevertheless create a ‘niche’ for the EU without the 
necessity to compete with the African missions.   
Third, the EU should establish clear rules for its relations 
with other security actors on the continent, the local 
ones in particular. To avoid being labelled as simply a 
donor that is easily replaceable, the EU should be clearly  
identified as the provider of necessary skills and ‘know-
how’. It should actively support the AU’s efforts to 
increase the self-funding of its peacekeeping initiatives by 
providing expertise and logistics. This should be done 
both to enforce the EU’s role as a knowledge and skills 
provider and also to prevent other actors, like China, 
from strengthening their influence – based on financial 
support that comes without political conditionality – in 
the region in ways that would marginalize the EU’s role 
on the continent. 
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